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The Political Economy of Welfare*
NANCY E. ROSE
California State University-San Bernardino
Department of Economics
Analyses of the U.S. welfare system in the tradition of political econ-
omy have tended to focus on the maintenance of a pool of low-wage
labor. This paper adds another dimension, as it incorporates govern-
ment work programs into a theory of the functions and nature of the
U.S. welfare system. Three dimensions of the welfare system are pos-
ited: (a) maintaining a stigma attached to welfare so that people are
encouraged to hold low-wage jobs: (b) maintaining welfare payments
at levels that do not interfere with the functioning of labor markets;
and (c) basing government work programs on principles that are con-
gruent with the logic of the market, i.e., profit criteria. Examples
drawn primarily from the 1930s to the 1980s are used to illustrate the
theory.
Reform of the welfare system has again been on the political
agenda during the 1980s. Increases in the incidence of poverty
focused attention on welfare and its alleged effect of providing
an attractive alternative to wage-labor. Traditional conservative
arguments that welfare increases work disincentives have been
embellished by relatively new charges that welfare is also re-
sponsible for the rise in poor female-headed families. Since the
welfare system has been charged with causing poverty, the nec-
essary cure according to conservatives has been forcing recipi-
ents to work outside their homes in exchange for their welfare
payments.
These theories of "poverty-by-choice" developed primarily
by George Gilder (1981), Ken Auletta (1982), Charles Murray
(1984), Lawrence Mead (1985), have provided much of the the-
oretical justification for the Reagan Administration's cuts in wel-
fare spending and implementation of work requirements.
*1 would like to thank Ellen Gruenbaum and two unnamed reviewers for
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (1984,
p. 3), while programs for low-income individuals comprised
approximately 10% of federal expenditures in 1980, they were
subjected to about 30% of the budget cuts between 1981 and
1984. And the Reagan Administration's support for workfare, in
which welfare recipients considered employable are required to
provide work that is normally paid a wage in order to receive
their welfare payments, has been incorporated into the 1988
welfare reform legislation.
The question arises of how to respond to the new conser-
vative theories about welfare and attacks on the welfare system.
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. doward, in their now-classic
Regulating the Poor (1971), have developed the most convincing
theory to date. They show how welfare reform has occurred as
a response of the government to militant protests of the unem-
ployed. When the protest abates, parts of the reforms are re-
scinded and restrictive relief practices are restored. Central to
their analysis is the function of welfare in maintaining the "work
ethic" and a sufficient pool of low-wage labor. Theorists writing
since Piven and Cloward's initial work have also addressed the
question of why women and-their dependent children have com-
prised the bulk of the poverty population (cf. Pearce, 1978; Shor-
tridge, 1985; Abramovitz, 1988). Mimi Abramovitz, in Regulating
the Lives of Women (1988), suggests that the welfare system has
been shaped not only by the work ethic, but also by the "family
ethic." The unpaid labor of all women in the home has been
maintained in conjunction with the low-wage labor in the mar-
ket of women who have not conformed with the family ethic
and whose improverishment has been caused by divorce, de-
sertion, single motherhood, or failure of their husbands to pro-
vide sufficient incomes. The aspect of welfare that needs further
theoretical attention concerns work, both work relief, provision
of welfare in exchange for work that is normally paid a wage,
and wage-labor. 1
In this paper I begin to address the gap in theories about
the welfare system by developing a theory of the functions of
welfare and the constraints imposed on it by U.S. capitalism in
which analysis of the nature and forms of work for relief recip-
ients is integral. Three dimensions of the welfare system are
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posited: (a) the "ideology of the dole" and the segmentation of
the working class; (b) the level of welfare payments and the
maintenance of labor markets; and (c) the form of work and the
logic of the market.
The "Ideology of the Dole" and Segmentation
of the Working Class
The first dimension of the welfare system concerns the cre-
ation and maintenance of divisions among members of the
working dass. It includes segmentation between the employed
and the unemployed, as well as among the jobless themselves.
Maintenance of these divisions impedes all members of the
working class, both employed and unemployed, from recogniz-
ing and perhaps acting on the fundamental commonality of their
situation-that they have no guarantee of a job and therefore
can be unemployed for periods of time.
The separation between workers who are employed and those
who are unemployed is maintained primarily through the "ide-
ology of the dole," the belief that most of the jobless are un-
employed due to laziness and inability to find jobs. However,
this flies in the face of the reality of capitalist economic systems,
which normally rely on unemployment and underemployment
in order to maintain profits. 2 Decisions about production and
investment are made by capitalist owners of the means of pro-
duction (i.e. buildings and equipment) based on the rates of
profit they expect to earn. Profits are derived from revenue (price
of the product times the quantity sold) minus the cost of pro-
ducing the product, and wages account for approximately half
of the costs of production. When unemployment falls, the bar-
gaining power of workers with jobs increases as there are fewer
unemployed workers to replace them. They are therefore more
able to obtain both higher wages and more control over the
production process, i.e. better working conditions. But this tends
to reduce profits, which in turn leads capitalists to cut back
production and delay investment projects. As a result fewer
workers are needed-and unemployment rises. Thus unem-
ployment is not caused by "lazy workers"-sufficient numbers
of jobs simply do not exist.
Segmentation among the jobless includes two types of over-
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lapping distinctions. One replicates divisions among the em-
ployed working dass-differentiation according to race, gender,
class, and citizenship (i.e. citizen versus noncitizen, commonly
termed "illegal aliens"). The other applies the "ideology of the
dole" to the unemployed themselves, and is expressed in terms
of the so-called "deserving poor" and the "undeserving poor."
The "deserving poor" are those deemed by society as wor-
thy, relative to the "undeserving poor," of receiving relief. There-
fore they are given more adequate aid, usually in a less
humiliating manner, than the "undeserving poor." From the early
1600s to the early 1900s the "deserving poor" consisted primarily
of middle-class widows and their dependent children. Consid-
ered unemployable, they were usually given "outdoor relief,"
i.e., they could receive welfare (formerly termed relief) while
living in the community.3 During this period the "undeserving
poor" included the able-bodied unemployed, as well as people
of color, recent immigrants, and women who had not conformed
to the family ethic. They were typically given only "indoor relief"
as they were forced to work in a workhouse (also called alms-
house or poorhouse) or poor farm, or were auctioned or inden-
tured to the lowest bidder, in order to receive minimal means
of subsistence.
From the 1870s through the 1930s recurrent severe recessions
that commonly sent unemployment as high as 25% of the labor
force, combined with periodic widespread and militant strikes,
led to a change in categories for primarily white, able-bodied
men who had proven their labor market attachment. These al-
tered categories were codified in the 1935 Social security Act.
Social insurance-which induded social security and unem-
ployment compensation-was established for the "deserving
poor," and public assistance-consisting of Aid to Dependent
Children, Aid to the Blind, and Old Age Assistance-was im-
plemented for the "undeserving poor." When the Social Security
Act was passed, social insurance mainly covered white males
in the primary labor market (the labor pool for the "giant cor-
porations" that form the industrial core of the economy) who
had worked for sufficient periods of time to qualify. However,
most workers in the secondary labor market (the labor pool for
smaller firms in the economic "periphery" that either deal with
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local markets, e.g. retail trade or construction, or receive sub-
contracts from the "core" firms) did not qualify. Furthermore,
domestic service workers and agricultural laborers, jobs usually
performed by women and people of color, were specifically ex-
duded from the social insurance programs of the Social Security
Act.
Social insurance coverage has been extended several times
since 1935 as new forms and definitions of labor force attachment
have been enumerated. The first instance was the 1939 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act, which expanded eligiblity for
social security-at much lower payment levels-to widows and
children upon the death of the qualifying spouse. Additional
categories of jobs, e.g. government workers and employees of
nonprofit agencies, have also been included in social insurance
programs. Furthermore, new programs have been developed so
that social insurance currently includes the following: Old Age
.Security and Disability Income (OASDI), i.e. social security and
disability insurance; medicare, both Hospital Insurance (HI) and
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); unemployment com-
pensation; worker's disability compenation; Black Lung disa-
bility payments; and a variety of veterans benefits.
Public assistance, the second form of welfare, is conditionally
available to people who often work sporadically-part-time and/
or part-year-in secondary labor market jobs. The original pro-
grams have been altered and new ones have been added so that
public assistance currently includes the following: Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Aid to Families with
Dependent Children with Unemployed Parents (AFDC-UP);
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the needy aged, blind
and disabled; medicaid; Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program (LIHEAP); subsidized housing; food stamps; school
lunches; supplemental food program for women, infants and
children (WIC); and general assistance (state-provided aid with
no federal supplementation).
Several studies have shown that movement between public
assistance, especially AFDC, and low-wage work is indeed the
norm. Bennett Harrison (1979) demonstrated in a five-year study
of 2700 AFDC families that 92% of them included a member
who was employed at least once during this time period. Sar
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Levitan (1982) noted that there is much movement on and off
the welfare rolls, as 3/10 of the families on AFDC leave the rolls
after one year, and 3/4 leave within three years. Additional anal-
ysis by Mary Corcoran, Greg J. Duncan, and Martha S. Hill
(1984) of an extensive set of longitudinal and cross-sectional data
collected through the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
showed that only ten percent of welfare recipients are "chronic,"
i.e. remained on the welfare rolls for eight out of ten years.
These facts dispute another widespread notion, as they dearly
show that most welfare recipients do not remain on the rolls
their entire lives.
Differences between social insurance and public assistance
dearly reflect the notions of "deserving poor" and "undeserving
poor." Social insurance payments are based on (mandatory) con-
tributions to trust funds by workers and their employers. Re-
cipients are considered to have a legitimate right to these
"entitlements" and eligibility is determined by past labor force
status. Eligibility for public assistance, on the other hand, is
determined by a "means test" based on people's income, assets,
and need. Subjected to application and recertification processes,
recipients are continually required to prove their neediness. Fur-
thermore, the "ideology of the dole" has led to the widely ac-
cepted belief that these payments are not really legitimate.
Women and their dependent children have comprised the
vast majority of those categorized as "undeserving poor" and
receiving public assistance. For example, among families with
income below the poverty line in 1987, 34.2 percent were headed
by women compared to 8.2 percent headed by men (Bureau of
the Census, 1988, Table 714, p. 434), and in 1985 approximately
94 percent of AFDC recipients and 84 percent of food stamp
recipients were women and their dependent children (Coalition
on Women and the Budget, 1986, pp. 15-17). Women's overre-
presentation in the ranks of the poor results from both the "fam-
ily ethic" and the sexual division of labor. Whereas men's work
has traditionally been performed for wages in the public sphere,
women's work has traditionally been done in the private sphere
of the home. 4 Thus the crucial work of childrearing and home-
keeping is not generally recognized as "real work"-unless
someone comes into another person's home to perform these
tasks for a wage-and its value is trivialized. This devaluation
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of women's work has then been extended to their wage-labor,
and helps account for the income gap of 64 percent (in 1987)
between women's and men's wages. 5
Furthermore, the tenacity of racism in U.S. society can be
seen in the persistence of the belief that most welfare recipients
are black and hispanic women. In fact, racism is to blame for
the higher incidence of poverty among blacks and hispanics
compared to whites. For example, in 1987, the poverty rate for
blacks was almost three times the rate for whites, and the rate
for hispanics was 2.5 times the white rate (Bureau of the Census,
1987, Tables 714 and 715, pp. 434-435).
The Worktest
An institution that has historically helped maintain the dis-
tinction between the "deserving poor" and the "undeserving
poor" has been the worktest. Applied to some or all of the "un-
deserving poor" much of the time since capitalism developed,
worktests require recipients to perform labor in order to prove
that they are not "shirking work" and therefore deserve to re-
ceive welfare. However only relief-not wages-is given in
exchange.
The worktest was dearly evidenced in workhouses that were
set up from the mid-1600s through the 1900s. Eligibility was
determined by the "workhouse test," as only the most destitute
who had no other means of subsistence would enter the work-
house to work in exchange for usually meager amounts of gruel
and bread. Early workhouses, established when increases in the
number of paupers made congregate care more efficient than
indenturing, auctioning, or boarding individuals in homes in
the community, were not the mean-spirited institutions of the
19th century. However, as industrial capitalism took hold in the
early 1800s, the need to ensure an adequate supply of workers
who had no means of support other than their ability to work
led to the implementation of very punitive procedures. This pol-
icy was most dearly articulated by the British in the New Poor
Law Commissioners Report of 1834:
Into such a house none will enter voluntarily; work confinement,
and discipline, will deter the indolent and vicious; and nothing
but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which
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must be obtained by the surrender of their free agency, and the
sacrifice of their accustomed habits and gratifications. Thus the
parish officer, being furnished an unerring test of the necessity of
applicants, is relieved from his painful and difficult responsibility;
while all have the gratification of knowing that while the necessi-
tous are abundantly relieved, the funds of charity are not wasted
by idleness and fraud (Quoted in Piven and Cloward, 1971, pp. 33-
34).
As workhouses were transformed into homes for the indigent
elderly in the first half of the 1900s, the "workhouse test" evolved
into the worktest.
The worktest has been evidenced during the 1980s in the
proliferation of workfare and WIN (Work Incentive) Demonstra-
tion programs implemented by individual states. Programs such
as GAIN (Greater Avenues of Independence) in California, ET
(Employment and Training) Choices in Massachusetts, and JEDI
(Jobs for Employable Dependent Individuals) in Maryland, they
have used a combination of incentives (carrots) and sanctions
(sticks) to move welfare recipients into the low-wage labor mar-
ket. A variety of components have typically been included in
these programs. Job Search involves individual or group ("Job
Clubs") activities, including help with resume writing, inter-
viewing skills practice, access to the state computer job bank,
and/or simply phoning employers who advertise for help. Some
of the programs offer education, including GED (General high
school Equivalency Degree), ESL (English as a Second Lan-
guage), and/or basic adult education. Training components, both
dassroom and on-the-job, are often included. On-the-job train-
ing has often been implemented through Work Supplementation
Programs (WSPs), also called "grant diversion," in which part
of a worker's welfare check is "diverted" to the employer. In
addition, subsidies for a portion of work related expenses
(WREs)-childcare, transportation, and sometimes medicaid-
are often included. The importance of these "experimental" pro-
grams cannot be understated. Although only 22% of all AFDC
recipients in states with WIN Demonstration programs operat-
ing a full year by 1985 participated in the programs (General
Accounting Office [GAO], 1987, p. 54), they served as the basis
of the 1988 welfare reform legislation.
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The stick, which can be found in all of the workfare and
WIN Demonstration programs with the exception of Massachu-
setts and Maine is the work requirement-i.e. worktest-for
those who fail to acquire a job after participating in education,
training and job search components (if the programs contain
them). Ignoring their unpaid labor in the home, welfare recip-
ients considered employable are required to provide additional
work outside their homes in exchange for their welfare pay-
ments. Employability for women is defined by the age of the
youngest child, usually six or three, and unemployed fathers in
the states with AFDC-UP are usually considered employable as
well. The maximum number of work hours is determined by
dividing the welfare payment by the minimum wage rate ($3.35/
hour nationally in 1988, but sometimes higher locally). Noncom-
pliance can lead to sanctions, usually temporary reduction or
suspension of the welfare grant (Dickinson, 1986, p. 269; GAO,
1987, pp. 55, 56, 62).
Worktests have historically served several purposes. Eligible
people are sometimes discouraged from applying for or receiv-
ing relief, as they try to subsist instead on their own increasingly
inadequate resources. This, in turn, reduces the cost of welfare
by decreasing the number of cases on the rolls. Worktests also
reinforce the "ideology of the dole" by seeming to validate the
view that people on relief are lazy and will work only if forced
to do so. Discrimination against women is reinforced by ob-
scuring the fact that welfare mothers already work-raising chil-
dren-and forcing them into workfare jobs in addition to their
unpaid work in the home. Furthermore, in the 1970s and 1980s
workfare programs have been criticized as threatening to public
sector unions, who feared replacement of their workers with
less-costly, non-union program participants (GAO, 1987, p. 110).
Current workfare and WIN demonstration programs have
been the subject of much debate. Although supporters claim that
these programs help AFDC recipients learn work skills and hab-
its, and thereby become self-supporting, studies by the GAO
and the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC)
have shown that program graduates primarily end up with low-
wage and/or part-time jobs that leave them below the poverty
level and sometimes still on welfare (GAO, 1987, pp. 103-104;
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Gueron, 1986, p. 13). This follows, in part, from the emphasis
of the programs, as relatively little has been spent on either
education or training, which could potentially help welfare re-
cipients increase their skills, and consequently their wages, or
on support services, especially childcare. 6 Instead, Job Search,
least costly and least controversial of all the components, has
been used most often (GAO, 1987, pp. 70-71).
In opposition to the stick of the worktest is the carrot of
voluntary government work programs. Inducement is used in-
stead of force, typically by granting a larger payment than would
be received through direct relief. Voluntary work relief programs
are represented by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), estab-
lished during the Great Depression of the 1930s. By the time
Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in March 1933, meas-
ured unemployment stood at 25 percent of the labor force, with
less than one-fourth of the unemployed receiving any relief (Bu-
reau of the Census, 1970, p. 126; Piven and Cloward, 1971, p. 60).
Responding to hunger marches and other actions organized by
Unemployed Councils for more relief, New Deal officials quickly
implemented policies designed to counter the "ideology of the
dole" by creating voluntary work relief at rates of pay approxi-
mating private sector wages (but with less hours). The programs
were sizable. Between 1.4 and 3.3 million people were given
work each month on the FERA and the WPA, and 4.3 million
were on the non means-tested Civil Works Adminstration (CWA)
at its maximum in mid-January 1934 (Whiting and Woofter,
1941, pp. 46 & 48; WPA, 1942, p. 46).
Other government work programs have contained both coer-
cive elements of the worktest and incentives of voluntary pro-
grams. Sticks and carrots have been most clearly combined in
the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, established in response to
low rates of unemployment and escalating welfare rolls, and de-
signed to more effectively channel the poor into low-wage labor
markets. From its inception in 1967, welfare recipients over age
16 who were not attending school or needed in the home to care
for a dependent were referred to the welfare department to reg-
ister for WIN. In 1971 the Talmadge amendments strengthened
the stick by mandating registration for those considered em-
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ployable, primarily unemployed fathers and mothers with school-
age children (under age six), in order to continue receiving wel-
fare. Noncompliance could lead to sanctions, although according
to Mildred Rein (1982, p. 212) they were rarely applied. The
carrot in the WIN program was the "income disregard," as the
first $30 per month plus 1/3 of the remaining income was not
counted in the determination of a recipient's welfare payment,
and a portion of WREs were reimbursed. Despite insufficient
funding for both services and WRE subsidies, the fact that the
proportion of AFDC recipients working for wages remained at
14-16% of the caseload from WIN's inception through the late
1970s led to a consensus that WIN was a failure and to conse-
quent calls for further program changes (Rein, 1982, p. 212; Smith
and O'Brien, 1978).
In 1981, the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA),
which authorized the establishment of workfare and WIN Dem-
onstration programs, also took a large bite out of the WIN carrot
as it ended the income disregard after the first four months of
employment, replaced the unlimited WRE disregard with a flat
monthly disregard of $75 (prorated for part-time workers), lim-
ited childcare subsidies to $160 per month per child, and based
the disregard on gross (instead of net) income with an eligibility
limit set at 150 percent of each state's need standard. According
to Robert Moffitt and Douglas A. Wolf (1978), this resulted in
the elimination from the welfare rolls of 35% of the "working
poor" who had received welfare to augment low earnings. The
OBRA's draconian reforms have been modified slightly since
1981-as of 1988 the income disregard indudes the first $105 of
wages plus 1/3 of the remaining during the first four months of
employment, and the $105 portion is extended for another eight
months. The OBRA has brought the WIN program into closer
conformity with its true acronym, WIP.
The Level of Welfare Payments and the Preservation
of Labor Markets
The second dimension of the welfare system concerns the
interaction between the level of welfare payments and the func-
tioning of labor markets. Payments are provided at levels suf-
ficiently lower than prevailing local wage rates to prevent people
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from making the "rational economic choice" of receiving welfare
instead of selling their labor-time for a wage. If this were to
occur, labor markets could be impaired, and the capitalist labor
process could be threatened.
Corroborating evidence for the need to maintain welfare
payments far enough below wage rates can be found in the re-
sults of the New Jersey, Seattle and Denver income-maintenance
experiments. In these experiments, conducted in the 1970s,
people's "work incentive," i.e., their supply of labor-time, was
adversely affected by the receipt of welfare payments that were
dose to their potential wages. However, people in different sit-
uations displayed varying degrees of responsiveness. Given
similar percentage increases in payments, women, especially
female heads of household, reduced their labor supply more
than men. And both males and females between the ages of 16
and 21 manifested significant reductions in labor supply (Office
of Income Security Policy, 1983; Harold W. Watts and Albert
Rees, 1977).
The welfare system contains several mechanisms to try to
ensure that relief payments remain sufficiently below prevailing
local wage rates. Currently the level of payments varies among
the different states for all forms of social insurance and public
assistance except social security and food stamps. Social security
old-age insurance provides uniform payments throughout the
United States because the recipients are "retired," i.e., no longer
in the labor force.7 Therefore, the level of payments for social
security poses little threat to the functioning of labor markets in
different areas of the country. SSI covers the needy aged, blind
and disabled, also considered out of the labor force. In fact,
disability is judged by a person's inability to hold a job. Finally,
food stamps are based on the same criteria throughout the U.S.
because they are well below the amount needed to survive, e.g.,
in 1987, the average monthly food stamp payment was $46.07
per recipient (SSA, 1987, p. 296). Furthermore, almost half of
those receiving food stamps also receive AFDC, which varies
throughout the U.S. according to the level of wages in each state.
Consequently, the level of AFDC payments has historically been
higher in the higher-wage states of the North than in the lower-
wage states of the South, e.g., in 1987, average monthly AFDC
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payments (per family) ranged from lows of $103.50 in Missis-
sippi and $112.87 in Alabama to highs of $513.66 in California
and $549.84 in Alaska (SSA, 1987, p. 295).
According to the logic of capitalism, welfare payments also
need to be furnished at levels sufficiently below wage rates in
order to maintain profits. Not only do local wage rates function
as a ceiling for the level of welfare payments, but welfare pay-
ments also serve as a floor for the entire wage structure. It has
been true historically that by providing some protection against
job loss, higher levels of welfare have helped bolster wage rates
and lower levels of welfare have been one of the factors allowing
capitalists to cut wages. Thus, although the policy elicited often
strident protest from capitalists, New Deal officials were gen-
erous with welfare payments partly to increase the "purchasing
power of the masses" and thereby boost consumption and ag-
gregate demand (Rose, in press-a). On the other hand, at times
when wages have been under attack, the amount and level of
welfare payments have also been targets for reduction. This has
been clearly manifested by the Reagan Administration in its
attempt to restore the disciplinary effect of unemployment
through its multifaceted attack on labor. Thus the (inflation-ad-
justed) value of AFDC payments (per recipient) has continued
the decline that began in the late 1970s, falling 18% from 1977
through 1985 and helping to bolster the 10% decrease in private
sector (non-agricultural inflation-adjusted) wages that started in
1974 (SSA, 1987, p. 294; Bureau of the Census, 1988, Table 648,
p. 392).8 Furthermore, many people in families with incomes
below the poverty line receive no welfare-in 1985 only
33 percent received AFDC and 61% received food stamps (SSA,
1987, pp. 75 & 296).
In spite of this logic, welfare payments are sometimes dose
to, or even higher than, income from wage-labor. This has been
true in the 1980s for many participants, and especially graduates,
in WIN and WIN Demonstration programs because wages mi-
nus expenses (the participants portion of childcare, transpor-
tation, and uniforms, as well as medical care) are often less than
AFDC payments (plus food stamps and medicaid). Despite this
economic irrationality, the GAO (1987, p. 112) found that many
people continue to work for wages rather than receive welfare.
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Reflecting the effects of the "ideology of the dole," an ET grad-
uate explained: "After living on welfare, just about anything
looks good. It might be just a little bit more money for a lot of
work, but a lot of people will grab it" (Amott and Kluver, 1986,
p. 19).
Welfare payments have also directly subsidized low-wage
labor markets. Historically this has taken three forms:
(a) implementation of the worktest; (b) supplementation of wages
with welfare; and (c) restriction of welfare payments to force
people into jobs, both to increase the supply of low-wage sea-
sonal agricultural workers and to break strikes.
The worktest directly aids the functioning of the secondary
labor market by making these typically low-wage, non-union
jobs more attractive than relief. Consequently, by compelling
unemployed people to accept the lower wages and generally
worse working conditions in these jobs, compared to jobs in
the primary labor market, the worktest in effect subsidizes prof-
its. Furthermore, punitive work relief can help push people into
jobs from their positions as "discouraged workers" who drop
out of the labor force and receive welfare. This seems to have
been one result of the workfare and WIN Demonstration pro-
grams in the 1980s.
Supplementation of wages with relief has existed in various
forms for almost 200 years. It was first institutionalized in 1795
in the English Speenhamland system, was wages below the
minimum amount needed to supply workers and their families
with a sufficient amount of bread were augmented with relief.
Criticized for depressing wage rates (since wages were supple-
mented with relief) and preventing the development of a mobile
working class (since people were required to remain in their
parish in order to receive relief), the Speenhamland system was
terminated in 1834 and replaced by the very repressive revised
Poor Law.
Supplementation of wages with relief has also been evidenced
in the U.S. Despite protestations during the Great Depression
that it would further reduce private sector wage rates, relief was
given to approximately 500,000 wage-laborers (FERA, 1935a,
pp. 9-11). Currently supplementation occurs through the WIN,
WIN Demonstration, Work Supplementation, and some work-
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fare programs, as participants often simultaneously work for
(low) wages and receive some welfare payments. Indeed, the
GAO (1987, p. 105) found that more than 48% of those who
participated in a work program continued to receive AFDC after
they found a job.
Closing welfare roles to force people into jobs has also been
used periodically. Even during the New Deal examples abounded
of FERA and WPA officials closing relief rolls to force workers
into the fields during harvest and planting times (FERA, 1935b,
p. 49). In addition, the initial FERA policy of providing relief
to strikers was abandoned in September 1934 during the wide-
spread East coast textile strike. The practice of dosing welfare
rolls to ensure an adequate supply of seasonal agricultural labor
was continued through the 1940s, 1950s and into the 1960s. Wel-
fare rights organizing focused attention on this policy, and in-
stances of temporarily dosing the relief rolls to force people into
the fields now seem uncommon. However, provision of relief to
workers on strike, which was restored as a result of the pro-
gressive reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, was again terminated
in 1981 by the OBRA.
The Form of Work Relief and the Logic of the Market
The third dimension of the welfare system concerns the form
of government work programs, and whether they preserve or
interfere with the logic of the market. Since goods and services
are produced in the private sector only if profits are expected to
be sufficient compared to other uses of the money, e.g., financial
speculation, the logic of the market dictates that profitability is
the primary determinant in capitalists' decisions regarding pro-
duction and investment. Depending on the degree to which the
logic of basing production decisions solely on needs replaces the
logic of the market, government work programs can potentially
cause people to question the basic rationale of capitalism. The
more consonant government work programs are with produc-
tion-for-profit, the more supportive they are of capitalism. Con-
versely, the more dearly government work programs are based
on needs, the more problematic this can be for the economy.
There are three basic forms of government work programs
with respect to the logic of the market vs. the logic of needs.
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They are, in order of their potential ability to create problems
(with the least problematic listed first): (a) work in the private
sector; (b) already existing work in the public sector; and
(c) public sector projects that are created explicitly for govern-
ment work programs.
The first form, work in the private sector, affords the least
opportunity for issues of needs to be raised. These positions are
firmly embedded in production-for-profit and therefore are the
most consonant with the logic of the market. Most of the jobs
obtained through WIN, WIN Demonstration, and workfare pro-
grams-though not the work requirement itself-fit in this
category.
The second form of work, positions already existing in the
public sector, can be more problematic than those in the first
location because the public sector generally does not operate on
profit criteria. Indeed, issues of needs have more easily been
raised with respect to public sector services, in terms of both
social value and the way in which the services are performed,
than has been the case in the private sector. Jobs acquired in the
public sector by participants in WIN, WIN Demonstration, and
workfare programs, though again excepting work requirements,
are representative of this category.
Government work programs that are potentially the most
problematic for capitalism involve projects that are specifically
created or augmented for program participants since they are
outside the normal channels of economic activity. Projects that
are part of programs implemented in response to high unem-
ployment, e.g., the FERA, CWA, and WPA in the 1930s and the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in the
1970s, reveal some of the contradictions of capitalism by show-
ing that the market itself does not create sufficient numbers of
jobs. Furthermore, since these projects allow the jobless to work
together specifically as unemployed, issues of needs can surface
relatively easily. Worktests, which also fall into this category,
have restrained the logic of needs from surfacing by being so
dearly based on punitive principles. Even so, as Piven and Clo-
ward point out that in their discussion of the historical prece-
dents of the 1980 attack on welfare, ". . . manufacturers were
always wary of the possibility that the workhouse, or any or-
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ganized work-relief program, would nurture nascent forms of
social production to compete with the market" (Piven and Clo-
ward, 1987, p. 12).
There are three different sub-types of these specially-created
work relief projects. Again in order of their potential for causing
problems (with the least potentially problematic listed first) they
are: (a) construction and other forms of manual labor; (b) public
services; and (c) production-for-use. Of these, construction and
other manual labor affords the least opportunity for the logic of
needs to replace profit criteria since, of the three, they most
dosely resemble private sector jobs. Public service projects offer
more opportunities for issues of needs to arise because one of
the primary rationales for their existence is the provision of ser-
vices to meet human needs. In voluntary programs the other
rationale is to furnish jobs for certain groups of workers, usually
those in the white-collar and professional categories. This was
evidenced during the 1930s as both the FERA and the WPA
established projects for teachers, writers, artists, actors, musi-
cians and photographers, as well as thousands of positions gath-
ering data and conducting research.
The third sub-type of specially-created work projects, and
the one that is potentially the most problematic for capitalism,
is based on production-for-use. This is in dear opposition to
production-for-profit. Production-for-use projects were an im-
portant component of the FERA, providing work for approxi-
mately 350,000 people at their height in the Winter of 1935 (Kerr,
1935, p. 2). Labeled production-for-use, or production-for-use
and distribution, by FERA administrators, they included the
following: sewing and mending garments; gardening and can-
ning produce; canning the meat and producing goods from the
hides of animals dying from the drought; aid to self-help co-
operatives set up by the unemployed; producing mattresses and
bedding (using surplus cotton collected by the Agricultural Ad-
justment Administration); and producing consumer goods (pri-
marily long underwear and other clothing) in factories that had
been totally or partially shut down by their owners and subse-
quently rented by local relief administrations. Although the goods
produced in these projects were distributed only to others on
relief, the projects elicited such virulent protest from capitalists
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that all except the first two were terminated by late 1935 when
the FERA was replaced by the Social Security Act and the WPA
(Rose, in press-b).
Programs since the 1930s have incorporated lessons learned
then from perceived threats to the logic of the market. Although
workfare programs have created a good deal of service work,
issues of needs have rarely surfaced. Voluntary programs, on
the other hand, have created problems. In the Public Employ-
ment Program (PEP) from 1970-1973 and the subsequent Public
Service Employment (PSE) component of CETA, many special
projects were created, e.g., repair of public buildings, summer
recreation and conservation, and weatherization of low-income
homes. Yet restrictions imposed on these projects to ensure that
they not replace "normal government operations" led to unceas-
ing criticisms of inefficiency and "make-work." It then proved
quite easy for the Reagan Administration to end PSE in 1981
and terminate the entire CETA program the following year.
Conclusion
What recommendations does this theory suggest for welfare
reform? Most fundamentally, recognizing that welfare recipients
perform needed work-raising children-and a needed function
for capitalism-maintaining a pool of low-wage workers-leads
to the conclusion that welfare is, in a sense, payment for these
services. As activists in the Welfare Rights Organization made
dear two decades ago, welfare should be seen as a right, not as
a privilege (cf. Tillmon 1976). Treating welfare as an entitlement
would mean that it would no longer be necessary to devote time
and energy differentiating between the "deserving poor" and
the "undeserving poor," and the resources that have been spent
on the often confusing and humiliating procedures of certifica-
tion and periodic recertification could instead be used to provide
needed payments and services.
Viewing the welfare system through the three dimensions
leads to further guidelines for government work programs. First,
participation should be voluntary. Welfare recipients should have
the choice between working in the home (in exchange for wel-
fare payments) or working outside the home. Following this logic
further, only carrots, but no sticks, should be used to induce
participation in the programs. In place of sanctions, options for
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all program participants should indude educational classes and
a variety of training programs leading to jobs that pay wages
above a redefined poverty line (based on multiplying the min-
imum food budget by 4, since food now comprises approxi-
mately one-fourth of a family's budget, instead of by 3 as is
currently done). To ensure that everyone receives enough to live
decently, welfare payments should also be set to at least equal
this new poverty line. This could be accomplished, in part, by
adopting a $7.20/hour minimum wage (in 1988 and indexing
future increases to inflation), as full-time, year-round work would
then result in redefined poverty-level income for a family of
three. Quality, federally-subsidized childcare for both welfare
recipients and those not on the rolls would serve as a crucial
incentive to enter voluntary government work programs or go
straight into the labor market. Making quality childcare avail-
able to all would preclude the development of a two-tiered child-
care system, a means-tested one for welfare recipients and a non
means-tested system for everyone else. Furthermore, to help
eliminate the economic rationality of going back on welfare in
order to obtain medical care, a national health system should be
implemented for all citizens regardless of employment status.
Finally, the government should provide jobs when the pri-
vate sector fails to do so. It is dear from the experience of the
1930s that this capability exists. If, in the depths of the great
depression when the federal government was far smaller than it
is today, work was provided each month for 1.4 to 4.4 million
people out of a labor force of 51 million (in 1933) to 55 million
(in 1938), then surely our current government could create work
for similar percentages of today's labor force of 120 million. Crit-
icisms of inefficiency and make-work that were targeted toward
the FERA, CWA, and WPA in the 1930s, and again in the 1970s
toward the PEP and CETA, could be countered by arguing that
programs should be based on the logic of needs instead of the
logic of the market. We could then begin to develop a welfare
system in which people, instead of profits, are treated with
respect.
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Notes
1. Work relief is contrasted to direct relief, welfare payments in exchange
for work done in the home, primarily raising children.
2. The two other methods of maintaining capitalist profits involve clear
government intervention in the economy: fascism, a political system in
which an authoritarian government uses unconcealed power supported
by a nationalist ideology to secure "co-operation" of workers and limit
their demands; and social democracy, a system that has developed in
countries where the labor movement has been strong enough to form a
compact with capital and demand high wages, good working conditions,
and relatively well-developed welfare states.
3. In fact, the term "unemployable" is a misnomer because the same people
can be considered unemployable at one point in time and employable
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later, e.g., disabled people and women with children who were consid-
ered unemployable during the 1930s easily obtained manufacturing jobs
during World War II when the unemployment rate fell below 2%.
4. In addition, poor women, primarily recent immigrants and women of
color, have worked for the lowest wage jobs when they were able to do
so, e.g., not enslaved.
5. The 64% female/male wage gap includes only those who worked full-
time, year-round. When part-time and/or part-year workers are included,
the wage gap falls to 44%.
6. The 1985 GAO (1987, pp. 69-70) study found that approximately 10% of
the WIN Demonstration program participants reeived education and
training. More recently, in a 1986-1987 study of California's GAIN pro-
gram, Casey McKeever (1988, p. 4) found that only 1.5% of the regis-
trants received training. In terms of childcare, the GAO (1987, pp. 82-
83) study found that the median program paid a maximum of $160 per
month per child for childcare, far below the market rates in many areas
of the country, and that expenditures on childcare were only 6.4% of the
median program's total budget. McKeever (1988, pp. 3-4) found that only
19.8% of all participants (30% of single-parent families) received child-
care subsidies.
7. Social security recipients are not entirely out of the labor force since they
can work a designated number of hours until age 70 before losing part
or all of their benefits and can work an unlimited number of hours after
age 70 with no reduction in benefits.
8. The 34% decline in inflation-adjusted AFDC payments per family began
in 1968, shortly after the average size of AFDC families began falling
from 4.2 to its current level (maintained throughout the 1980s) of 2.9
(SSA, 1987, p. 294).
